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FOREST CITY ENTERPRISES, INC. V. CITY OF EASTLAKE:
ZONING REFERENDA AND
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
N THE RECENT OMIO SUPREME COURT DECISION of Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake,' the court stated a new principle of law
in the area of referendum zoning:
A municipal charter provision, which requires that any ordinance
changing land use be ratified by the voters in a city-wide election,
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power, in violation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
2
The court was, however, far from convincing either in terms of distinguishing
the prior law of referendum zoning or in demonstrating the applica-
bility of their conclusion to the specific facts of the case.
I. FAcrs OF THE CASE
The Eastlake scenario is not extremely complex. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc. is a large Ohio developer which owns an eight acre parcel of
land in the city of Eastlake, Ohio, a far-eastern suburb of Cleveland.
On May 18, 1971, Forest City applied to the Eastlake City Planning
Commission for the rezoning of their eight acre parcel from industrial to
multifamily high rise use.3 In the fall of 1971, the Eastlake city charter
was amended, via initiative petition, to include a zoning referendum
provision requiring that all ordinances passed by the city council af-
fecting existing land use receive 55 percent voter approval in a city-wide
election. 4 The Eastlake City Council amended the comprehensive zoning
'41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740, cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 185 (1975).
2 Id. (syllabus at 2).
3 A fact not mentioned in Eastlake by any of the justices was that the actual intent of the
developer was to build housing for the elderly. See Cleveland Press, Dec. 31, 1975, § 4,
at 4, col. 1. For a general discussion of "spot" zoning see R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING §§ 5.04-.13 (1968). See also Goodrich v. Town of Southhampton, 48 App. Div.
2d 921, 370 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1975).
41 Ohio St. 2d at 183 n1, 324 N.E.2d at 742 n.1. The charter provision provides in
pertinent part:
[A]ny change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any ordinance,
or the enactment of any ordinance referring to other regulations controlling the
development of land and the selling or leasing or rental of parkways, playgrounds,
or other citylands or real property, or the widening, narrowing, re-locating,
vacating or changing the use of any public street, avenue, boulevard, or alley
cannot be approved unless and until it shall have been submitted to the Planning
Commission, for approval or disapproval. That in the event the city council
should approve any of the preceding changes, or enactments, whether approved
or disapproved by the Planning Commission it shall not be approved or passed by
the declaration of an emergency, and it shall not be effective, but it shall be
rntandatory that the same be approved by a 55% favorable vote of all votes cast of
the qualified electors of the City of Eastlake at the next regular municipal elec-
tion, if one shall occur not less than sixty (60) or more than one hundred and
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ordinance as requested, after the Planning Commission approved the change
of use by Forest City. In April 1972, however, a preliminary permit to
commence building was denied by the Commission, since the proposed
amendment had not been submitted to the voters as mandated by the
charter referendum requirement.
Forest City sought relief in Lake County Court of Common Pleas re-
questing a declaratory judgment that the Eastlake charter provision requiring
voter approval to effect a zoning change was a violation of both the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the referendum provisions
of the Ohio constitution. 5 The mandatory referendum requirement was
upheld by both the trial court and court of appeals."
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed in a 5-2 decision finding that
article VIII, section 3 of the Eastlake charter constituted "an unlawful
delegation of legislative power, thereby denying appellant [Forest City
Enterprises] due process of law." The Eastlake court confined their
twenty (120) days after its passage, otherwise at a special election falling on the
generally established day of the primary election.
Eastlake City Charter, art. VIII, § 3 (1971). One writer has suggested that the current in-
creased use of referenda is, at least in part, related to a general distrust and disenchant-
ment with government, lawyers, and land developers. Kancler, Litigating the Zoning
Case in Ohio: Suggestions to Fill the Textbook Void, 24 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 33, 40 (1975).
For a summary of procedures required by Ohio statutes to effect an initiative and/or
referendum see Fordham & Leach, The Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 OHIO ST.
L.J. (1950); Fordham & Prendergast, The Initiative and Referendum on the Municipal
Level in Ohio, 20 U. CIN. L. REV. 313 (1951). See also, Kancler, supra at 40-42.
The trial court did strike down one aspect of the mandatory referendum as burden-
some. That provision required the rezoning applicant to bear the cost of the referendum
election. The city of Eastlake did not dispute that ruling in subsequent appeal. 41 Ohio
St. 2d at 183 n.2, 324 N.E.2d at 742 n.2.
5 OHIO CONST. art. II, § if:
The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each
municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be
authorized by law to control by legislative action; such powers shall be exercised
in the manner now or hereafter provided by law.
6 Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, Civ. 72-0219 (Ohio C.P. 197,2), aff'd,
Dkt. No. 4-263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973). Since application for rezoning by Forest City was
made prior to passage of the Eastlake charter amendment, Forest City unsuccessfully
contended at the trial court level the referendum requirement should therefore not be
applied retroactively. This argument is supported by Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio
St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960), where it was held that whenever a building permit applica-
tion has been filed a subsequent zoning change cannot be retroactively applied.
"[I1t is a fundamental principle of law that constitutional questions will not be decided
until the necessity for their decision arises." State ex rel. Lieux v. Village of Westlake,
154 Ohio St. 412, 415, 96 N.E.2d 414, 415 (1951); accord, Greenhills Home Owners
Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 5 Ohio St. 2d 207, 212, 215 N.E.2d 403, 407, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 836 (1966); Interstate Motor Freight Sys. v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 122, 134, 128
N.E.2d 97, 104 (1955); American Cancer Soc'y v. City of Dayton, 160 Ohio St. 114, 121,
114 N.E.2d 219, 223 (1953). Hence, it can also be argued that the issues decided by the
Ohio Supreme Court should never have been reached. Forest City, however, failed to
assign this as error at the intermediate court level. Thus, based upon the record before
the Ohio Supreme Court, the retroactivity argument could not have been properly con-
sidered. See, e.g., State v. Abrams, 39 Ohio St. 2d 53, 313 N.E.2d 823 (1974); State v.
Wallen, 25 Ohio St. 2d 45, 266 N.E.2d 561 (1971); State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins, 165
Ohio St. 185, 134 N.E.2d 839 (1956); Union Ins. Co. v. McGookey, 33 Ohio St. 555
(1878); Wolfson v. Horn, 94 Ohio App. 530, 116 N.E.2d 151 (1953).
7 41 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 324 N.E.2d at 747. 2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss4/4
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holding to the constitutionality of the charter provision. It neither decided
whether the original zoning of Forest City's property for industrial use was
reasonable8 nor whether Eastlake had engaged in "exclusionary zoning" to
exclude low and moderate income housing.9
II. THE EASTLAKE MAJORITY OPINION: A SURFACE THEME I0
A. The Ohio Zoning and Referendum Framework
As a prelude to the majority opinion, Justice Paul W. Brown summarized
existing Ohio zoning law. Initially considered by the majority" was the
landmark United States Supreme Court zoning decision, Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.12
Since Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co .... , the constitutionality
of zoning has not been questioned. Modem authorities agree
that some restrictions on the use of land are essential to orderly
community development. But because the power to zone infringes
upon the individual use of private property, the exercise of such
authority has been carefully hedged with procedural and substan-
tive safeguards. To be sustained as valid, a zoning ordinance
must be comprehensive in nature, must bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the public health, safety, welfare, or morals, and must
provide for the amelioration of unnecessary hardships imposed
upon the owners of specific property.1 3
Justice Brown then concluded from an analysis of several cases, including
Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park,4 that "the power to zone or rezone, via
passage or amendment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance, is clearly a
legislative function."' 5  Then, as if in passing, Justice Brown seemingly
8 id.
9 Id. Four of the seven Justices, a majority, did reach this issue in the concurring opinion.
10 Judicial opinions have perhaps been assuming the nature of a fugue. A fugue,
one may define for the benefit of those made tone deaf by years of listening to
legal jargon, is a musical form in which one theme appears on the surface but
quite another is subtly going on below.
Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions From Below the Bench, 49 CALnF. L. REv. 831, 839
(1961).
"1Justice Paul Brown was joined by Chief Justice O'Neill and Justices Herbert, Stern and
William Brown. Justices Corrigan and Celebreeze dissented.
12 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
13 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189, 324 N.E.2d at 743 (citation omitted). Justice Stem's concurring
opinion also began with an analysis of Ambler Realty. Id. at 198, 324 N.E.2d at 748.
Justices Paul Brown and Stern were quick to point out the "reasonableness" restrictions
upon the police power, but there is little doubt that the intent of the Supreme Court in
Ambler Realty was to create a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a zoning
law. 272 U.S. 365.
14 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 3, 233 N.E.2d 500, 501 (1968).
'5 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189, 324 N.E.2d at 743.
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adopted the rule of Hilltop Realty v. City of South Euclid,16 that "[t]he
zoning or rezoning of property is subject to the referendum process."' 7
The source for zoning power in Ohio is the "home rule" provision of the
Ohio constitution:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in
conflict with general laws.1
8
Eastlake has a duly-adopted charter thereby enabling the municipality to
adopt its own zoning scheme instead of conforming to the state statutory
procedure.' 9 Moreover, there is a strong presumption in Ohio that zoning
II 110 Ohio App. 535, 164 N.E.2d 180 (1960), appeal dismissed, 170 Ohio St. 585, 166
N.E.2d 924 (1960); accord, Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71
(1958); Stadle v. Township of Battle Creek, 346 Mich. 64, 77 N.W.2d 329 (1956); Denny
v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 202 N.W.2d 892 (1972).
17 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189-90, 325 N.E.2d at 743. The initiative and referendum powers are
derived from the OHIo CONST. art. II, § If. The referendum power is the power of the
electors of municipalities to require that ordinances passed by council be approved by the
people prior to becoming effective. Not all measures, however, are subject to referen-
dum. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 731.29-.30 (Page 1954). Initiative, in contrast, is the
power of the people to propose and adopt legislative measures.
There are three different types of referenda: An optional referendum involves a peti-
tion by the people to require submission of the measure to popular vote. A voluntary
referendum occurs when the legislature decides to have a proposed measure submitted
to the people for approval prior to it becoming effective. A mandatory (compulsory,
automatic) referendum absolutely requires voter approval for certain measures to take
effect. Fordham & Leach, supra note 4, at 495-96. Eastlake involved a mandatory
referendum whereas in Hilltop Realty it was optional.
A referendum petition in Ohio must be in compliance with statutory procedure or it
may be subject to attack. A petition must be filed within thirty days following sub-
mission of an ordinance to the mayor. If vetoed, it must be filed within thirty days after
council overrides the mayor. Delays are fatal. Additionally, the petition must include
the signatures of 10 percent of the qualified electors. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 731.29
(Page 1954); see Kancler, supra note 4, at 40-41. For a more comprehensive discussion
of referenda see 3 J. Fau.t, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 4.12 et seq. (11 ed. 1962).
OHIno CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. For decisions holding the power to zone to be a proper
exercise of the police power see, e.g., Bauman v. State ex rel. Underwood, 122 Ohio St.
269, 171 N.E. 336 (1930); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Smith
v. Troy, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 476 (Ct. App. 1834). See also the dissenting opinion of Judge
Wanamaker in City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 102 Ohio St. 341, 353-54, 131
N.E. 714, 718 (1921) for a very broad interpretation of local self-government.
19 See, e.g., Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 713.14 (Page 1954); see also Omo CONST. art. XVIII, §9 3, 7.
Although the "home rule" provision of the Ohio constitution authorizes all munici-
palities to adopt "police" regulations, including zoning regulations, it is necessary to
examine sections 2 and 7 of the same article to determine how these powers may be
exercised. Section 2 of article XVIII grants to the General Assembly the power to provide
the form of government in municipalities. Section 7 of article XVIII, however, allows
for the adoption of a municipal charter wherein the form of government and the proce-
dures for exercise of section 3 powers are provided. Thus, noncharter municipalties
or charter municipalities that fail to incorporate procedures for exercise of section 3
powers must conform to state statutory procedure.
The only restriction upon the scope of such state prescribed procedures is that they
cannot limit the home rule powers of the municipalities under the guise of procedural
guidance. 3 J. FAELL, OHIo MUNICIPAL CODE § 1.27(c),(d) (11 ed. 1962). Therefore:
Where a municipality has a city charter and the city charter sets forth a procedure
governing the steps necessary to effect a change in existing zoning classifica- 4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss4/4
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provisions of charter municipalities are valid, particularly when they are
alleged to be in conflict with state provisions. 20 The state statutes which
dictate the applicable procedures for enacting zoning regulations apply only
to noncharter Ohio municipalities, unless, of course, the municipal charter
specifically provides for their use. Consequently, the absence of a manda-
tory zoning referendum provision in the Ohio Municipal Code, alone, does
not prohibit Eastlake or any other Ohio charter municipality from enacting
such a provision. Hence, if viewed as an exercise of the right of a mu-
nicipality to establish by charter the procedures for administering its
zoning power, the Eastlake charter appears valid.
B. The Nature of Rezoning by City Council
The right to hold a referendum upon rezoning actions seems to be the
clearly established law in Ohio under Hilltop Realty and was impliedly
affirmed by the Eastlake majority. In Hilltop Realty, plaintiff realtors ac-
quired land which was zoned for single-family use. They received
approval from the South Euclid, Ohio City Council for rezoning to multi-
family use. Passed over a mayoral veto by council, the zoning ordinance
then fell subject to an initiative petition calling a referendum election.
The trial court granted an injunction to prevent the election,2 1 but the
court of appeals reversed, specifically rejecting the contention that the re-
zoning action was an administrative act.22 The court held that amending
a zoning ordinance was a legislative act included within the Ohio con-
stitution23 as a proper subject for a referendum. 24
Although Eastlake and Hilltop Realty are arguably distinguishable be-
cause in the former the referendum was mandatory and in the latter it was
not, a dominant rationale of the Eastlake decision was that the charter
referendum did not provide the citizenry with sufficient voting guide-
lines.25 Yet in Hilltop Realty, the people of South Euclid were not sub-
ject to any greater. standards in exercising their vote in the zoning refer-
endum. In both cases, the merits of the zoning change were evaluated
by city planning agencies and council, and the choice of the voters was
simply one of approval or disapproval.
tions, to a different zoning classification, the procedure set forth in such city
charter will govern.
Vito v. City of Garfield Heights, 200 N.E.2d 501, 503 (Ohio C.P. 1962), quoted in 1
R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.08, at 137 (1968).
20 Curtis v. City of Cleveland, 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959); Baker v. City of
Beachwood, 184 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); State ex rel. River Grove Park v.
City of Kettering, 118 Ohio App. 143, 193 N.E.2d 547 (1962); Beachland Glass Co. v.
Woodmansee, 230 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio C.P. 1967).
21 Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, Civ. 72-0219 (Ohio C.P. 1972).
22 Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, Dkt. No. 4-263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).
23 The initiative and referendum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each
municipality on all questions which such municipalities may now or hereafter be
authorized by law to control by legislative action; such powers shall be exercised
in the manner now or hereafter provided by law.
OHIO CONST. art. II, § If.
24 110 Ohio App. at 539-40, 164 N.E.2d at 183; cf. Witkin Homes, Inc. v. City & County
of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 410, 504 P.2d 1121 (1972).
25 41 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
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Theoretically, the citizens of South Euclid or any Ohio municipality
may petition for a referendum upon every rezoning action by council, and
accomplish the same purpose as that served by the Eastlake referendum
provision.26  One commentator has suggested that the Ohio Supreme
Court would presumably approve the use of a permissive zoning referen-
dum in Eastlake.27  "[T]here would be no problem of delegation of
legislative authority as the change in zoning would be legislatively final
.... ,2 A popular vote upon the rezoning would be dependent upon an
initiative petition to call an election. 29 This view is consistent with the fact
that the Eastlake majority did not decry nor expressly overrule Hilltop
Realty. Nevertheless, neither Eastlake nor any other decision either
explains or mandates a distinction between a referendum called by
initiative petition as opposed to one required by a city charter provision.
The court's analysis continued with a reference to Myers v. Schier-
ing.30 In that case, the city of Fairfield, Ohio zoned a particular area
as heavy industrial, pursuant to a zoning ordinance which specifically
provided that the city council could grant a special permit to landowners
in that area to create a dump or landfill.3' The Ohio Supreme Court
ruled in Myers that the granting of such a permit by city council was an
administrative action and therefore not subject to referendum. 32
Both Myers and Eastlake involved an application of the test dis-
tinguishing administrative and legislative action by a city council set
forth in Donnelly v. Fairview Park.3 An administrative action by a
legislative body as defined in Donnelly is "executing or administering
a law, ordinance or regulation already in existence," whereas legislative
action involves "enacting a law, ordinance or regulation."3 4
Thus, under Donnelly, the council action in Myers was administra-
tive in nature, since it consisted of granting a special permit for indus-
trially-related purposes in an area already zoned for industrial use. This
is similar to a variance, which is the modification of the use of prop-
erty due to some hardship, but substantially complying with the existing
use classification and restrictions under the comprehensive zoning
ordiLnance.3  'Tie council action in both Hilltop Realty and Eastiake,
however, consisted of rezoning - enacting new use classifications
through new zoning laws. These actions were clearly legislative in
nature.
26 See note 17 supra.
27 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFIciALs, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST No. 7,
at 14 (1975).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 27 Ohio St. 2d 11, 271 N.E.2d 864 (1971).
31 Id. at 13, 271 N.E.2d at 866.
32 Id. at 14, 271 N.E.2d at 866.
33 13 Ohio St. 2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968) (syllabus at 1, 2).
34 Id. (syllabus at 2).
35 A variance is a form of administrative relief which allows for the use of land prohibited
by ordinance. In cases of unnecessary hardship strict application of the literal terms of
zoning regulations is waived. A special permit or exception, in contrast, does not re-
quire a showing of hardship. Whereas a variance involves a departure from the terms
[Vol. 24:635
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While Myers was approved in Eastlake, Justice Brown's reference to
it can only be seen as part of the zoning law background he provided
as an introduction to his subsequent detailed analysis of "consent re-
quirements." Myers is of no real import to Eastlake and the opinion
only serves to confuse the issues by its reference. This confusion is
evidenced by respondent Forest City's brief to the United States Su-
preme Court in opposition to certiorari.," Argument I of the brief
suggests that the Ohio Supreme Court based Eastlake in part on the
status of the charter provision as a delegation of administrative power.
3 1
But the language of the Eastlake majority is clear: "[A] municipal charter
provision, which requires that any ordinance changing land use be
ratified by the voters in a city-wide election, constitutes . . . [a] delega-
tion of legislative power ...... 38 Moreover, since the Eastlake ma-
jority reached the basic constitutional issue that the Eastlake referendum
requirement was an unlawful delegation of legislative power in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment due process clause, they must have
concluded that Myers was not dispositive of the case.
The precise issue in Eastlake was the reasonableness of a zoning
procedure whereby every rezoning action by a city council is subject to
voter approval. There is really no problem in defining the nature of
such councilmanic action. Forest City Enterprises sought the change of
the zoning classification of its eight acre parcel to multifamily, high
rise usage from that of industrial usage. Their use change application,
therefore, made necessary the enactment of a new zoning classifica-
tion law by the city council, not a mere variance of existing usage.3 9
This was legislative not administrative action. Thus, under Hilltop
Realty, such an action was properly subject to referendum. This point
was not refuted by the Eastlake majority. Rather, they merely side-
stepped Hilltop Realty, used Myers as a smokescreen, and quickly
delved into the main focus of their opinion - consent requirements.
C. The Consent Requirement Conundrum
The court next discussed whether a mandatory referendum applied
to legislative land-use changes was a denial of due process of law to
aggrieved landowners in the position of Forest City Enterprises. This
was the basis of the majority's decision and revolved around three
United States Supreme Court decisions: Eubank v. City of Richmond,40
of the ordinance, an exception contemplates a use allowable under the ordinance
contingent upon a showing that the conditions are met. Rezoning or zoning amend-
ments are changes in existing legislation creating entirely different use classifications.
For a more detailed discussion of variances see 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF
ZONINC §§ 14.01 et seq. (1968).
36 Respondent's Brief in Oppostion to Certiorari, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 185 (1975).
37 Id. at 3.
38 41 Ohio St. 2d at 187, 324 N.E.2d at 740 (syllabus at 2) (emphasis added). Note
also a similar statement at 41 Ohio St. 2d 198, 324 N.E.2d at 747.
31 See note 35 supra.
40 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
1975]
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Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,41 and Washington ex rel. Seattle
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge.42  These three cases all involved "consent
requirements," a land-use control device whereby a property owner is
required by law to solicit the permission of neighboring parcel owners
before he may effect any change in the use of his land.
43
In Eubank, plaintiff requested and received a building permit from
the city of Richmond, Virginia, but was later prevented by the city
from commencing construction. A petition had been filed, pursuant to
a city ordinance, signed by two-thirds of the property owners on the
same block, requiring the Richmond City Council Committee on Streets
to establish a building line in conformity with neighboring buildings.
4 4
In Roberge, a Seattle ordinance permitted the building of a home for
the elderly when the builder first obtained the written consent of two-
thirds of the property owners in the area.45 Justice Brown was correct
in stating that these consent requirements were held to be invalid by
the United States Supreme Court as unreasonable and arbitrary exer-
cises of the police power.
46
In Cusack, the construction of a billboard in the City of Chicago
was prohibited by ordinance. The ban could be waived, however, if
the written consent of a majority of the landowners with property
frontage on both sides of the street surrounding the billboard site was
obtained. 4  The rationale for this requirement was that extensive
evidence indicated that billboards could become a public nuisance
or a potential danger. 4  The United States Supreme Court found this
to be a reasonable regulation for the preservation of the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare and upheld the ordinance.49
The distinctions to be drawn between these three decisions, though
somewhat clouded by the Eastlake majority, are twofold. First, the
emphasis in Eubank and Roberge was placed on the reasonableness of
the means of control.50 That distinction can be inferred from Justice
Brown's comparison of the cases.,' Secondly, the Eubank and Ro-
41 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
42 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
43 See 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 15.15 (1968). Consent requirements
are generally imposed in the area of special permits to protect neighboring landowners
from troublesome uses. See discussion in note 35 supra.
44 226 U.S. at 141-42.
45 278 U.S. at 118.
46 41 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
A reasonable use of property, made possible by appropriate legislative action,
may not be made dependent upon the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable
whims of the voting public.
17 242 U.S. at 527-28.
4s Id. at 529-30.
49 Id. But see City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v.
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
50 See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928).
51 41 Ohio St. 2d at 193, 324 N.E.2d at 745.
In Eubank, a reasonable use of property was prohibited by arbitrary fiat; in
Cusack, an unreasonable use of property was prohibited by valid legislative
action, subject to said prohibitions being lifted by those affected.
[Vol. 24:635
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berge ordinances enabled the property owners to use their land in the
desired manner, reserving an option for their neighbors to exercise a
veto upon such usage. In Cusack, the property owner was prohibited
from a particular use of his property by law, with a provision that the
prohibition could be lifted. 52
The majority's reliance on these cases required them to accept the
premise that a consent requirement from owners of adjacent property is
synonymous with a mandatory referendum among all the citizens of a
community.53  Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization
(SASSO) v. Union City,54 however, refused to accept that premise.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the consent require-
ment cases to be inapplicable to a referendum situation since in
the former the due process argument succeeds because the permit is
granted by an administrative board and thus no prior legislative de-
termination has been made relative to the public interest. 55  As set
forth in SASSO:
A referendum, however, is far more than an expression of
ambiguously founded neighborhood preference. It is the city
itself legislating through its voters - an exercise by the voters
of their traditional right through direct legislation to override the
views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public
interest.56
Nevertheless, the Eastlake majority viewed the question differently
and attempted a due process analysis of zoning referenda based upon
consent requirements.
If consent requirements are to be analogized with zoning referenda
as the Eastlake court assumed, then the holding in Cusack is most ap-
plicable. Forest City Enterprises, like Thomas Cusack Co., acquired
property that was already subject to the prohibitions of the city zon-
ing code against a particular use.5 In applying for rezoning, Forest
City, as did Cusack Co. in seeking consent, sought to have such pro-
hibitions removed. The procedure required by the city of Eastlake,
however, was an amendment to the city zoning code. Thus, the
"consent requirement" in Eastlake was the entire process of amending
the zoning code by enacting a law through councilmanic action and
voter approval. This may be described as a "telescoped" consent
requirement which includes a referendum. Without referendum ap-
Another writer has made the same distinction in a slightly different context. Comment,
Voter Zoning: Direct Legislation and Municipal Planning, 1969 LAW & SOCIAL ORDER
453, 462 n.44 (1969).
52 Cf. Norton Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 369 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
' 41 Ohio St. 2d at 191-95, 324 N.E.2d at 744-46.
54 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 294.
56 Id.
57 See also Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagrams-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194 (1936).
"[T]he restriction already imposed with the knowledge of appellants [landowners],
ran with the acquisition and conditioned it."
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proval, the ordinance amending the zoning code would be ineffec-
tive and Forest City would be left in no worse position than when they
first purchased the realty.5 8 The imposition of a use restriction is readily
open to charges of arbitrariness, as seen in Eubank and Roberge.
Within the limited factual setting of Cusack, however, a waivable
land use prohibition is not as subject to attack.5 9
D. May Policymaking be Left to the Public?
1. Can the Public be Trusted?
The majority opinion concluded by acknowledging that the basic
problem with the Eastlake scheme was that it allowed the people to
vote without any objective standards.60 In Hilltop Realty, however,
there were no standards to guide the people in their referendum vote,
yet that procedure was upheld. Further, the Eastlake majority failed
to suggest standards that might have eliminated the deficiency.
The court, moreover, cited McGautha v. California61 for the princi-
ple that fundamental policy choices must be articulated by some
responsible organ of government. 62  In McGautha, a convicted mur-
derer was sentenced to death in a separate proceeding following trial.
He appealed on the grounds that his constitutional rights were infringed
because the jury was free to condemn him without any objective
' "He who is not injured by the operation of a law or ordinance cannot be said to be
deprived by it of either constitutional right or of property." Thomas Cusack Co. v.
City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530 (1917); accord, State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v.
Combs, 129 Ohio St. 251, 194 N.E. 875 (1935) (syllabus at 3):
An ordinance requiring written consents of fifty-one percent of the property
owners in a residential district within a radius of six hundred feet from a filling
station, as a prerequisite to its installation, is not a delegation of legislative
power . . .and such consent provisions are not repugnant to our state or fed-
eral constitutions ....
59 Justice Brown used as support for the Eastlake decision:
If the existence of the law depends upon the vote or act of the people it is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, but if the law is complete in
and of itself the fact that it provides for the removal or modification of its pro-
hibition by the act of those most affected thereby, does not make it a delegation
of legislative power.
41 Ohio St. 2d at 195, 324 N.E.2d at 746, quoting Myers v. Fortunato, 12 Del. Ch. 374,
375, 110 A. 847, 848 (Sup. Ct. 1920). A relatively recent Delaware case, however,
thoroughly analyzed Fortunato, and placed that decision in its proper perspective:
This Court [in Myers v. Fortunato] thereby drew the well-recognized distinc-
tion between an ordinance permitting neighbors to remove a use restriction
and one permitting neighbors to impose a use restriction ....
Marta v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608, 611 (Del. 1968) (emphasis in original).
60 41 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
61 402 U.S. 183, 256, 270 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62 41 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746. Justice Brown recognized the importance of
protecting the citizenry from arbitrary exercise of municipal authority by providing that
policy choices, which are at the root of that authority, be made by responsible organs of
government. Justice Stern, concurring, seemed to acknowledge Justice Brown's position
adding, however, that zoning changes involve property in which most voters have no
interest because of its distance from their homes. To allow them to make decisions up-
on such voting changes would be government by caprice. Justice Stern's position sup-
ports Justice Brown's by example. It is a weak one, however, and moreover, only sig-
nificant in large cities. 10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss4/4
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standards.6 Contrary to the aforementioned "principle" delineated
by Justice Brown, the United States Supreme Court in McGautha found
"it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled dis-
cretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases
is offensive to anything in the Constitution.."
6 4
Although such a holding clearly does not condemn the Eastlake ref-
erendum procedure, it should be noted that in Eastlake the interest at
stake was not of as great a consequence as the interest in McGautha.
Furthermore, whether required or not, there are certain preliminary stan-
dards used by Eastlake in changing an existing land use. The proposal
is given a hearing before the City Planning Commission under prede-
termined guidelines set forth in the zoning code. It is then examined
under those guidelines and voted upon by city council. Ultimately, the
people vote in an open election. 65 The reasons for the Ohio Supreme
Court's awkward reliance upon McGautha in their discussion of unre-
strained, arbitrary enforcement of the law are unclear. There is stronger
precedent in this vein - most notably, the landmark case Yick Wo v.
Hopkins.6 6
In Yick Wo, an ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco
provided that it was unlawful to engage in the laundry business within
the city or county limits without the Board of Supervisors' permission,
unless located in a brick or stone building. 6 It was shown, however,
that this regulation was not uniformly applied. The Supervisors en-
forced it against launderers of Chinese origin, but not against native
Americans. 68 Thus, the United States Supreme Court found that such
a rule conferred upon the Board of Supervisors a naked, arbitrary power
to give or withhold consent, making all those engaged in the laundry
business the tenants at will under the Board of Supervisors. 69
One writer has attempted to distinguish Yick Wo from McGautha
upon the theory that there is a long tradition of faith in the jury system in
this country.7 0  When applied to Eastlake, however, Yick Wo fails to be
supportable. There is an equally long tradition of referenda in this coun-
63 402 U.S. at 185.
61 Id. at 207.
65 The notion that a planning commission might subject the zoning proposal to objective
standards (the city building and zoning codes), and then submit the proposal to city
council and voter approval, can be analogized to a trial court's use of criminal code ob-
jective standards to judge guilt before a sentencing hearing ever takes place. Cf.
Comment, Capital Sentencing, 45 TEMp. L.Q. 610, 630 n.49 (1972). The United States
Supreme Court has ruled, in a similar context, that one hearing, at whatever stage, can
serve to satisfy due process. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53
(1941). The concept that the above hearing should take place by way of open, public
debate was accepted in Dwyer v. City Council of Berkeley, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932
(1927). See also San Diego Bldg. Contractor's Ass'n v. City Council of San Diego, 13
Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, appeal filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3042 (U.S.
May 20, 1975) (No. 74-1459).
66 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
67 Id. at 357.
61 Id. at 359.
61 Id. at 373-74.
70 Note, Capital Sentencing by a Standardless Jury, 50 N.C.L. REV. 118, 126 n.44 (1971).
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try. This is borne out by the significant Supreme Court decision in
James v. Valtierra7 1 which was accorded little weight by the Eastlake
majority.
2. Valtierra and the Exercise of Democratic Decisionmaking
Consistent with their questionable positions regarding Hilltop Realty,
Cusack, and McGautha, the Eastlake court declined to accept the clear
holding of Valtierra. A provision of the California constitution7 2 re-
quired a mandatory referendum as a condition precedent to the construc-
tion of low rent housing. The Court upheld the mandatory referendum,
placing special emphasis throughout the opinion upon the long tradition
of referendum usage in California.7 3
The decision in Valtierra has been criticized by several writers.
7 1
Although these critics have divined discriminatory motives in the case,75
it is significant that none have attempted to criticize the California man-
datory referendum as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The great import of Valtierra can be summarized:
When a mandatory referendum is authorized, the Court must
presume, as it did in Valtierra, that "referendums demonstrate
devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or preju-
dice."76
One writer has emphasized that Valtierra represents the ultimate triumph
of Justice Black's belief in the high priority of voters' rights in the scheme
of other federally recognized rights.77
71 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
72 CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1:
No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed or ac-
quired in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified
electors of the city, town, or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed
to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve
such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that purpose,
or at any general or special election.
13 402 U.S. at 141-43. Despite the holding in Valtierra, the referendum was not without
early roadblocks in California. See, e.g., Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279 (1874).
74 Note, Mandatory Referendum on Low-Income Housing, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV.
603 (1972); Note, Discrimination Through Exclusionary Housing Referenda: James v.
Valtierra, 5 LoYoLA U.L.A.L. REV. 368 (1972); Note, Mandatory Referendum: Equal
Protection Anomoly? 1971 UTAH L. REV. 553; Note, Public Housing for Low Income
Families - Mandatory Referendum Requirement, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 268.
15 The facts of the case, however, led Justice Black to comment:
[T]he record here would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral
on its face is in fact aimed at a racial minority.
402 U.S. at 141.
76 Note, The Application of the Equal Protection Clause to Referendum-Made Law:
James v. Valtierra, 1972 U. ILL. L. FORUM 408, 427 (1972), quoting James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
77 Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59
CALIF. L. REV. 1384, 1393 (1971), quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 397
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
Just consider that for a moment. In this Government, which we boast is "of
the people, by the people, and for the people," conditioning the enactment of
a law on a majority vote of the people condemns that law as unconstitutional
in the eyes of the Courtl
[Vol. 24:635
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Justice Brown attempted to avoid Valtierra by stating that it concerned
low rent public housing, not zoning. 78 This seems an insignificant, if
not erroneous, distinction, particularly since Forest City Enterprises in-
tended to build multifamily housing for the elderly. Moreover, at least
one court has interpreted Valtierra as encompassing zoning referenda. 79
The emphasis in Valtierra was upon the long history of referenda
in California. 0 It is clear, however, that California has not enjoyed a
monopoly on the referendum process.8 ' Ohio legislatures and courts
have explored and long approved referenda and referendum-type pro-
cedures.82 In his dissenting opinion in Eastlake, Justice Corrigan con-
78 41 Ohio St. 2d at 197, 324 N.E.2d at 747.
79 City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972), cert.
discharged, 268 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
80 Justice Black noted the presence of a referendum provision in the 1849 California
constitution. 402 U.S. at 141. Article VIII of that constitution set a $300,000 state
debt limit and made any exception subject to a mandatory referendum. Other manda-
tory referendums noted by Justice Black included: state constitutional amendment re-
moval; issuance of long-term bonds; territorial annexations; and alienation of park
property. 402 U.S. at 142.
si See generally E. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (1893). The referendum
concept in the United States was borrowed from the Swiss where certain cantons had
provisions for compulsory referenda on all appropriations of money. Id. at 11. In
America, the celebrated New England town meeting had been in operation before
1643. Id. at 25. The eminent nineteenth century jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley,
traced the works of several early American writers concluding that
the constitution has been adopted in view of a system of local government
[and] . . . the liberties of the people have generally been supposed to spring
from, and be dependent upon that system.
People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 43, 98 (1871) (emphasis added). See also Judge Wana-
maker's powerful dissent in State ex tel. City of Toledo v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71, 126,
102 N.E. 670, 681 (1913), where he emphasized that "[tihe cornerstone of American
government is found in that fundamental principle: 'All political power is inherent in
the people'."
Various state constitutions were approved via referenda with provisions that the
constitutions be periodically resubmitted to public vote. State ex rel. Nolan v. Clen-
dering, 93 Ohio St. 264, 278, 112 N.E. 1029, 1033 (1915). The referendum concept
was also used in a variety of areas throughout the nineteenth century: Maine (1820,
apportionment), OBERHOLTZER, supra at 62; Pennsylvania (1836, whether to establish
schools), id. at 65; Rhode Island (1842, governmental expenditures), id. at 55; Texas
(1845, annexation to United States), id. at 54; Wisconsin (1885, women's sufferage),
id. at 61; Wyoming (1889, location of state colleges), id. at 53. Finally, several early
decisions upheld laws against claims that the referendum procedure was not republican.
Wales v. Belcher, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 508, 510-11 (1826) ("Why may not the legislature
make the existence of any act depend on the happening of any future event? Consti-
tutions themselves are so made . . . . We see no impropriety, certainly no unconstitu-
tionality, in giving the people the opportunity to accept or reject such provisions.").
People v. Reynolds, 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) 1, 15 (1848) ("[T]he legislature may delegate
authority, either to individuals or to bodies of people, to do many important legislative
acts .... "). See also Burgess v. Pue, 27 Md. 9, 14-15 (1844).
s Under the 1802 Ohio constitution, a constitutional convention could not be called for
purposes of amending the constitution without a majority of the popular vote. OHIo
CoNsT. art. VII, § 5 (1802). The 1851 constitution was adopted by referendum, Id.
Schedule, § 17 (1851), and it provided that constitutional amendments must be approved
by public vote. Id. art. XVI, § 1. In 1912, initiative and referendum procedure was
adopted, OHIO CONST. art. II, §§ 1-1g (1912).
It is significant that in adopting the referendum procedures, the constitutional con-
vention was concerned with the experience of California with her then recently adopted
provisions. See Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State
of Ohio, vol. 1, at 675-79 (1912).
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cluded that an examination of Ohio legislation indicated that "submis-
sion of zoning resolutions to electors by referendum is not an innovative
concept."83  More importantly, there are several examples of laws sub-
ject to mandatory referendum under the Ohio Revised Code.8 1
The legitimacy of the voters' interest in zoning was addressed by the
Supreme Court in Valtierra: "[T]his procedure ensures that all the peo-
ple of a community will have a voice in a decision which may lead to
large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased public ser-
vices and to lower tax revenues."8 5  Furthermore, Valtierra should not
be limited to its facts. As stated in Johnston v. City of Claremont:
The right of referendum with respect to zoning ordinances
is essential for the protection of the rights of the electors of
each city. A zoning ordinance can and does have a more direct
and lasting effect upon property values and property owners
within a city than almost any other type of ordinance. What is
done with respect to one piece of property of necessity has an
effect, good or bad, upon adjacent or nearby property.86
The Ohio Supreme Court decision of Cook-Johnson Realty Co. v.
Bertolini, 7 which upheld referendum zoning in a township, seems con-
sistent with the long Ohio history of referenda. Moreover, the Ohio law
prior to Eastlake appeared to be settled that the existence of charter
provisions regulating specific, mandatory referenda were not in con-
flict with state code provisions. 8
A most interesting case which involved issues analogous to those in
Eastlake was Columbia Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of Columbus,"' in which
the city charter provided that any change in utility rates would be in-
operative without voter approval.90 In consonance with the referenda
Additionally, under article II, section 30, any proposal to alter county boundary
lines must receive referendum approval. OHIO CONST. art. XVII, § 8. Finally, creation
of an Ohio municipal charter commission or adoption of a charter both require referen-
dum approval. Id.
13 41 Ohio St. 2d at 206, 324 N.E.2d at 752 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
Adoption of zoning in Ohio counties or townships is subject to mandatory referen-
dum proceedings, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 303.11, 519.11 (Page 1953), and referendum
petitions may be submitted upon any amendment or supplements. Id. §§ 303.12, 519.12
(Page Supp. 1974).
84 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 133.16 (Page Supp. 1974) (majority approval re-
quired at general election; 60 percent at special election); id. § 133.17 (majority ap-
proval required); id. § 139.02 (Page 1969) (65 percent approval required); id. § 306.32
(Page Supp. 1974) (majority approval of voters in affected region required); id. §
306.49 (majority approval required); id. § 718.01 (majority approval required); id.
§ 1515.04 (65 percent approval required); id. § 5705.19 (Page 1973) (majority approval
required at general election; 55 percent at special election).
85 402 U.S. at 143.
88 49 Cal. 2d 826, 837 P.2d 71, 78 (1958). See also Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v.
City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 205, 324 N.E.2d 740, 751 (1975).
87 15 Ohio St. 2d 195, 239 N.E.2d 80 (1968). See text accompanying note 221 intra.
81 See State ex rel. Bramblette v. Yordy, 24 Ohio St. 2d 147, 265 N.E.2d 273 (1970);
accord, Dillon v. City of Cleveland, 117 Ohio St. 258, 158 N.E. 606 (1927); see also
State ex rel. Conn v. Noble, 165 Ohio St. 564, 138 N.E.2d 302 (1956).
89 42 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1930).
91 Id. at 380.
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tradition in Ohio and the reasoning of Valtierra, the referendum was up-
held:
The constitutional referendum provision was inserted for the
protection and benefit of the people of the municipalities; not
for that of the utilities. Neither the city nor its inhabitants are
complaining. In their wisdom, the people of Columbus saw fit
to further limit the power of council by requiring a referendum
in every case of franchise grant and rate regulation. They were
not content to leave this to the vigilance of individual citizens.
This was a matter, we think, properly subject to charter provi-
sion under the Home Rule Amendment (Const. Ohio art. 18),
and in no wise inconsistent with the lesser protection afforded
by the Constitution . . . .The constitutional provision for ref-
erendum is not made inoperative; the people have but limited,
in their control of the local government, the possibly broader
powers of council without such limitation. This certainly vio-
lates no constitutional right . . .
III. THE CONCURRING OPINION: THE THEME BELOW
In Justice Stem's concurrence in Eastlake he addressed what he con-
sidered the broader issues raised by the case.9 2 His arguments were
directed toward finding the Eastlake charter zoning referendum invalid
based on its burdensome nature, and the resultant exclusion of persons
of low and middle income - so called "exclusionary zoning."
9 3
A. Mandatory Referendum Zoning:
Is it a Burden Upon too Many Interests?
Justice Stern commenced his analysis with a consideration of Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.9 4 as did Justice Brown for the majority,
but the concurring opinion instead placed emphasis on the strong dictum
of Justice Sutherland:
If it be a proper exercise of the police power to relegate indus-
trial establishments to localities separated from residential sec-
tions, it is not easy to find a sufficient reason for denying the
power because the effect of its exercise is to divert an industrial
flow from the course which it would follow, to the injury of the
residential public if left alone, to another course where such
injury will be obviated. It is not meant by this, however, to ex-
clude the possibility of cases where the general public interest
would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.95
91 Id. at 381-82.
92 41 Ohio St. 2d at 198-201, 324 N.E.2d at 748-49.
93 Id. at 199, 324 N.E.2d at 749.
94 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
95 41 Ohio St. 2d at 199, 384 N.E.2d at 748, quoting 272 U.S. at 389-90 (emphasis in
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Thus, Justice Stern set the stage for an examination of whether the
Eastlake charter referendum provision was a reasonable and proper
function of the police power to zone, or whether it was an abuse of such
power.96 He adopted an equal protection test of "weighing . . . the
general public interest against the interests of a municipality." 97 When
applied to Eastlake, however, this balancing test is inadequate.
The interests of the property owner and the interests of a municipality
are at stake and thus properly subject to consideration. Equally at issue
are the interests of neighboring landowners. Justice Stem alluded to
this, but appeared to equate the neighboring landowners' interests in
maintaining the existing zoning with those of the municipality. 8 The
City of Eastlake Planning Commission and city council, however, ap-
proved Forest City's application for rezoning. Therefore, members of
the neighboring community desiring no land use change to occur (who
would have likely voted against rezoning in the mandatory referendum)
did not share all of the same interests with the municipality.99
If Eastlake is to turn upon a balancing of interests, then a tripartite
methodology ought to be employed. The equation would include a full
acknowledgment and consideration of all interests at stake: the interest
of a landowner to rezone and use his property more profitably; the in-
terest of a municipality in planning proper land usage for community
needs; and the various interests of the neighboring community affected
by rezoning. Justice Stern equated the interests of the municipality and
original). In Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the United States Supreme
Court, per Justice Sutherland, applied this emphasized admonition to find a municipal
zoning classification clearly unreasonable and therefore an unlawful taking of property
without due process of law. In Nectow, petitioner landowner sought to have his property
rezoned from residential to industrial usage, since the surrounding neighborhood land
uses were primarily industrial.
96 See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
97 41 Ohio St. 2d at 199, 324 N.E.2d at 748. See generally Comment, Constitutional
Law: Equal Protection - An Emerging Standard of Review, 13 WASHBURNL.J. 106
(1974).
98 Lawyers for Housing argued that these status quo interests were intended to curb
growth under a "prevailing ethic that 'no growth is good growth'." Brief for Lawyers
for Housing as Amicus Curiae at 12, Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake,
41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
99 It may be argued that the Eastlake Planning Commission and city council approved
Forest City's use-change application only because they were certain it would be disap-
proved by the voters in the referendum. But does such a view accord with common
sense? If a city in Ohio desires to prevent a use-change application from succeeding.
tying it up in the courts by denying the application and then litigating the matter upon
appeal seems a better route than taking the chance that the voters will disapprove it.
See generally Kancler, supra note 4. Five years of litigation culminated with United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
2656 (1975), where it was held that the zoning out by the city of a planned multifamily
housing development had a racially discriminatory effect and was thus invalid. The
Black Jack court thus ordered the city to permit construction of the housing project.
This was a hollow victory, however, for fair-housing advocates, since inflation had
raised construction costs and interest rates to the extent that the project would never be
built. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1976, at 24, col. 1. Legal fees amounting over a period of
years are most certainly another drain on the funds of groups promoting low income
housing, and therefore serve to quell incentive to build such housing when protracted
litigation is threatened.
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the neighboring community, thereby overlooking the interests of the latter
group.
The concurring opinion focused upon the third and last element of
the reasonableness test for zoning ordinances outlined by Justice Brown
for the Eastlake majority: "[A] zoning ordinance . . . must provide for
the amelioration of unnecessary hardships imposed upon the owners of
specific property."'00  Justice Stern viewed the actual purpose of the
Eastlake charter provision to be the obstruction of land use change by
"rendering such change so burdensome as to be prohibitive."10' The
provision was regarded by him as imposing, rather than ameliorating,
unnecessary hardships upon the owners of specific property.
Justice Stern implied that the charter referendum provision was
adopted under questionable circumstances while Forest City's rezoning
application was pending before the Eastlake Planning Commission and
city council.10 2  He further gave little weight to the charter provision re-
quirement of a 55 percent affirmative vote in the mandatory referendum
for any proposed use change. 10 3  Also mentioned was the cost of the
mandatory zoning referendum which fell upon the use-change applicant,
whether or not his request met voter approval, such cost not being speci-
fied in the Eastlake charter. 0 4 Justice Stern then abruptly concluded
that "[tihere is no subtlety to this; it is simply an attempt to render change
difficult and expensive under the guise of popular democracy.' 0 5
Considering the charter provision apart from the harsher provisions,
Justice Stern advanced a public policy argument that a city-wide manda-
tory referendum places the fate of a property owner's use-change appli-
cation with voters who have neither knowledge of nor interest in the
property. 0 6 He illustrated his point by analogizing to the situation that
would be presented if a large city like Cleveland were to adopt a similar
referendum provision, In his view this would be "government by ca-
price, and would certainly dilute the private ownership of property."'10
7
Certainly, there are serious problems underlying the Eastlake rezon-
ing procedure. It appears to render useless the presumably careful
100 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189, 324 N.E.2d at 743, adopting the view taken in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The other two elements of this test are the
comprehensiveness of the zoning ordinance and the zoning provision's reasonable rela-
tionship to the public health, safety, welfare, or morals.
101 41 Ohio St. 2d at 199, 324 N.E.2d at 748.
102 Id. See note 6 supra for the proposition that the Eastlake charter amendment should
not have applied retroactively to Forest City's use change application.
10' Id. Thus, he impliedly approved Forest City's argument that 46 percent of the voters
may thwart simple majority approval of rezoning. See Respondent's Brief in Opposi-
tion to Certiorari at 8-9, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 185
(1975).
104 41 Ohio St. 2d at 199-200, 324 N.E. 2d at 748. As set forth at note 4 supra, the lower
court struck down this cost requirement and Eastlake did not dispute the ruling in its
subsequent appeals. At least one state, however, provides that use-change applicants
bear some of the costs of a zoning referendum. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-124 to -141
(1956).
105 Id. at 20, 324 N.E.2d at 748.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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land-use considerations of planning commissions, zoning boards, and city
councils. Thus, municipal planning interests are seemingly thwarted
along with private property interests. As one writer has commented,
the mandatory referendum "seems obviously inconsistent with the con-
cept of representative government."'' 0  It also appears to make land-
use changes very time consuming to achieve.
Justice Stern saw no "proper public purpose" to justify the Eastlake
procedure; there are, however, community interests which should al-
low the mandatory referendum to stand. Foremost is the substantial,
legitimate interest of the community in voting on local land-use issues,
highly regarded by the Court in James v. Valtierra.10 9 Justice Stern
considered the general public to be uninformed upon zoning matters
and thus, unworthy of being entrusted with such judgments. Yet it
should be realized that the public is not necessarily less knowledgeable
concerning zoning matters than with other issues commonly subject to
the elective process." 0
Another factor disregarded by Justice Stern was the peculiar and dis-
turbing rule in Ohio that a zoning ordinance passed as an emergency
measure by council of a chartered municipality precludes a referendum
election called by initiative petition.' The community interest in ensur-
ing that a large land developer does not influence local officials to grant
rezoning through overbearing or improper methods thus seems far from
being unfounded. At least one writer has attributed this interest as a
major factor in the development of the mandatory zoning referendum." 2
Justice Stern's analogy to the problem presented by thousands of
people voting upon proposed land-use changes miles from their neigh-
borhoods, which would ensue if a large city like Cleveland was to zone
via mandatory referendum, is a valid public policy consideration. The
155 Kancler, supra note 4, at 40.
159 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Accord, Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Orgs. (SASSO)
v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321
(6th Cir. 1969); Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968); State ex rel. Bram-
blette v. Yordy, 24 Ohio St. 2d 147, 165 N.E.2d 273 (1970); Cook-Johnson Realty Co.
v. Bertolini, 15 Ohio St. 2d 195, 239 N.E.2d 80 (1968). See text accompanying notes
72-91 supra. Zoning changes can in some instances have a tremendous impact on local
taxes. E.g., James v. Valtierra, .402 U.S. 137 (1971); Brief for the Cities of Euclid,
Kirtland, Willoughby Hills, and Willowick as Amicus Curiae at 12, City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, 96 S. Ct. 185 (1975).
110 Admittedly, an Ohio referendum zoning question is rather vaguely worded, much like the
following: "Shall Permanent Parcel No. 123-45-678 be changed from 'x' use classifica-
tion to 'Y' use classification?" Arizona and Oregon have a more informative approach.
They provide for the publication of the land-use measure to be voted upon in pam-
phlet form with the inclusion of supporting and opposing arguments. Amrz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-141(B), (C) (1956); OFF. REV. STAT. § 254.130 (1968). In Arizona, the pam-
phlets are paid for by the city or town, except that the proportionate costs of the paper
and printing are chargeable to those submitting arguments. The pamphlets are dis-
tributed to every registered voter within the municipality at least eight days prior to
the election. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-124 to -141 (1956). See also Comment,
supra note 51, at 459.
n Partain v. City of Brooklyn, 101 Ohio App. 279, 133 N.E.2d 616 (1956). This is not
true, however, for a noncharter municipality, Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447,
123 N.E.2d 419 (1954).
112 Kancler, supra note 4, at 40.
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city of Eastlake, however, is not greatly populated." 3  It appears rea-
sonable to say that the citizens of a small municipality are better informed
of and are more directly affected by land-use changes than is the popu-
lace of a large city. Therefore, the analogy cannot be said to be complete-
ly dispositive of the matter when consideration is limited to Eastlake or
other small municipalities. Additionally, the concurring opinion failed
to address the competing interests of all the parties concerned with
mandatory zoning referenda. It is serious analytical flaw to consider
only the interests of private landowners.
B. Exclusionary Zoning and Zoning Referenda
Justice Stem next addressed the additional considerations mandating
the invalidity of the Eastlake charter zoning referendum. In concluding
that the referendum provision improperly excluded persons of low and
middle income,1 4 he clearly implied that the Eastlake provision also
excluded persons on the basis of race. Thus, Justice Stem indicated
that the city of Eastlake, through its charter zoning referendum, was
engaged in unlawful exclusionary zoning. This issue was not presented
by the parties to the suit, Forest City and the city of Eastlake, but rather
was injected into the proceedings before the Ohio Supreme Court by
Lawyers for Housing as amicus curiae. 15 Justice Stern regarded the
underlying "motive" of the Eastlake charter referendum to be that of
excluding minorities and the poor which would have the "inevitable ef-
fect" of perpetuating class and racial divisions in our society." 6
1. Exclusionary Zoning
a. Defined
Exclusionary zoning has been a burgeoning aspect of zoning litiga-
tion in the past decade." 7 This concept can be described as zoning which
113 The city is populated by approximately 20,000 people. Cleveland Press, Dec. 29,
1975, at A-4, col. 2.
114 41 Ohio St.2d at 201, 324 N.E.2d at 749. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145
(1971), Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued that classification on the basis of income is
suspect and therefore requires close judicial scrutiny.
11 Brief for Petitioners at 17 n.13, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S.
Ct. 185 (1975). See Brief for Lawyers for Housing as Amicus Curiae, 41 Ohio St. 2d
187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975). An amicus curiae appears as a friend of the court either
at the court's invitation or by grant of its request to appear. Accordingly, the amicus
curiae is not a party to the action. Board of Comm'rs v. Cooper's Unknown Heirs, 75
N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947), appeal dismissed, 152 Ohio St. 202, 88 N.E.2d 293
(1949). He must accept the case as he finds it with the issues presented by the parties.
3A C.J.S. Amicus Curiae § 7, at 430 (1973).
"6 41 Ohio St. 2d at 200-01, 324 N.E.2d at 749.
17 Commentary upon this topic is quite extensive. Recent analyses include: R. BABCOCK
& F. BOSSELAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND HoUsING IN THE
1970's (1973) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN]; E. BERGMAN, ELIMINATING
ExcLUSIONARY ZONING (1974); 3 N. WILLAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 66.01-
.52 (1974); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Symposium: Exclusionary Zoning, 22
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results in racial or economic segregation rather than the promotion of
the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of a community. The
term "exclusionary zoning" is actually redundant as virtually all zoning
excludes, in some manner, certain types of land uses from particular
areas."" Land usage is restricted through exclusionary zoning, however,
to so-called "desirable" persons of a certain color or economic status,
under the guise of constitutional zoning laws.
Traditional zoning cases have been basically of two types. The first
involves suits by landowners which challenge zoning restrictions that
prevent them from using their land most profitably, generally alleging
that such property is being "taken" by the local government without due
process of law." 9 The second embraces actions by aggrieved neighbor-
ing landowners in cases where a developer has been granted a variance
by the local zoning board, permitting him to modify the use of his land,
because the rigid zoning code imposes an unusual hardship on him. 
1 20
The exclusionary zoning cases of recent years differ in a number of
respects from tradition. Plaintiffs in such cases are often low income
persons, minorities, or organizations that represent their interests.' 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 465 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84
HARv. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home be a Castle?,
69 MICH. L. REV. 339 (1970); Note, Exclusionary Zoning: A Question of Balancing Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Environmental Concerns, 8 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1190 (1974).
For a good overview and summary of many recent exclusionary land use decisions,
see NATIONAL COMMrITrEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING AND URBAN LAND
INSTITUTE, FAIR HOUSING & EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE (1974) [hereinafter cited as U.L.I.
RESEARCH REPORT 23].
1"' Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1210, 1212 (1973).
119 Sloane, Overview, in National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, Exclu-
sionary Land Use Litigation: Policy and Strategy for the Future 1, 3 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Sloane]. For a thorough history and study of traditional land use prob-
lems across the nation see F. BOSSEuLIAN, D. CALi s & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE
(1973). And for a wide-ranging overview of judicial approaches to said traditional
line see Feiler, Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. URBAN L. 319 (1969).
120 Sloane, supra note 119. For instance, the local zoning code may require a house to be
set back 40 feet from a street. But a developer desirous of building a house finds
this impossible because a stream cuts through his lot 39 feet from the street. Thus,
he applies to the appropriate municipal agency, such as a zoning board, for a "variance"
to permit him to "vary" from the local comprehensive 40 foot setback requirement so
that he can build the house closer to the street. If the city refuses the application,
the developer will invariably argue that such action is a "taking" of his property with-
out due process of law since the setback requirement has worked to render his property
useless without the variance.
121 Id. at 3-4. But see Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), where the Supreme Court
denied standing to low income residents of Rochester, New York, relative to a bias at-
tack on the comprehensive zoning ordinance of Penfield, New York, a Rochester sub-
urb. The town allocated 98 percent of of its vacant land to single family detached hous-
ing. The Court felt that the plaintiffs did not allege specific, concrete facts showing
that Penfield's zoning scheme harmed them personally. The Court concluded that
Rochester's minorities were excluded from Penfield because of the economics of the
area's housing market rather than the zoning law in question. The Court also denied
standing to taxpayers from Rochester, local fair housing groups, and a building trade
association. The import of Warth is being swiftly realized as the Court subsequently
vacated the Sixth Circuit's reinstatement of a housing discrimination suit by inner city
residents against a suburb, and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration in
light of Warth. City of Parma v. Cornelius, 95 S. Ct. 2673 (1975), vacating and re-
manding mem., 507 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974), vacating and remanding mem., 374 F.
Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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Most exclusionary zoning cases are brought in federal rather than state
court and involve charges of illegal exclusion against local governments
under the United States Constitution and federal laws, 22 as opposed
to the traditional zoning plea of an unlawful "taking" of property with-
out due process. 2 3
b. Exclusionary Land Use Practices and Devices
12 4
One would be hard-pressed to find a modern zoning ordinance so
crudely drawn as to overtly exclude a particular group or class of per-
sons. 1 25 Zoning on explicit racial lines was held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court over five decades ago in Buchanan v. Warley.126  For
about thirty years afterwards, most efforts to promote racial segregation
in housing shifted to the use of racial covenants.127 Such covenants
generally took the form of restrictions upon the conveyance, rental, or
lease of real property to persons of various racial minority groups. These
restrictive covenants were struck down in the landmark case of Shelley v.
Kraemer2 1 as a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Also considered unconstitutional are alien land laws, legislation
designed to forbid the ownership of land by aliens ineligible for naturali-
zation. 29
After the invalidation of racial covenants in Shelley,130 zoning has
been increasingly, employed as a device for the exclusion of minorities
l22 Sloane, supra note 119, at 4. Exclusionary zoning cases are frequently brought under
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983
(1970), and the right to travel. See Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusion-
ary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61, 65 n.16 (1972). Professor
Norman Williams, Jr. argues that state courts provide a better forum for exclusionary
zoning suits than federal courts, since the former are more experienced in zoning litiga-
tion than the latter, and appear to take a more critical view of exclusionary land-use
controls. Williams, Anti-Exclusionary Litigation - In What States?, in National Com-
mittee Against Discrimination in Housing, Exclusionary Land Use Litigation: Policy
and Strategy for the Future 40 (1974). See, e.g., Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of
Toledo, P-H EQUAL Opp. IN HOUSING 13,736 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1975); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713
(1975).
123 See generally, F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLiES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
Lower income persons normally have no property to be "taken" since they are alleging
exclusion from a community in the first place, hence the resort to federal remedies.
But such lack of ownership appears to preclude standing to bring suit. See note 121,
supra; Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197. 2216 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 1 or a good overview of early discriminatory housing practices see 2 N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 59.01-61.02 (1974).
125 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protec-
tion, 1971 LAND USE CoNTo.s ANNUAL 196.
128 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
127 WILLIAMS, supra note 124, § 59.07, at 576.
128 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (racial cove-
nants could not be enforced indirectly by damage suits against those who convey, rent,
or lease to racial minorities in breach of such covenants).
129 WILLIAMS, supra note 124, §§ 61.01-.02
132 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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and the poor,' 3' often assuming a variety of forms. The prevalent land-
use controls alleged to constitute such exclusionary zoning are the sub-
ject of the following discussion.
i. Exclusionary Action by Local Governmental Officials
Although not exclusionary zoning per se, discriminatory governmental
action is as much a violation of equal protection as is such action ef-
fected through zoning. For instance, the exercise of discretionary power
by local officials in withholding building permits for low cost housing
was held to be a discriminatory, exclusionary tactic in Kennedy Park
Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna.131 There the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court ruling which ordered
building permits to be issued for construction of a Federal Housing Ad-
ministration sponsored public housing project in a predominantly white
residential area. The city of Lackawanna unsuccessfully sought to justify
its action on the grounds that the project would severely burden its
sewer system and that the site was needed for a public park.1 3   The
city's action was held to be violative of equal protection and the Civil
Rights Act of 1968.134
The denial of funding by local government for a proposed middle and
low income housing project was at issue in Citizens Committee for Fara-
day Wood v. Lindsay.135 In Lindsay, no denial of equal protection was
found by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City's deci-
sion not to proceed with a proposed housing project and its consequent
refusal to process applications for financing construction of the project.
The court held that the city's action was rational and that it could not
be compelled to build a specific housing project merely because it com-
menced to plan such a project. 136 In reaching its decision the court
clearly distinguished its prior decision in Lackawanna. It noted that in
Lackawanna the housing project was designed exclusively for low income
persons, a disproportionate number of whom where nonwhite; eighty
percent ,of the housing units in Lindsay, however, were reserved for mid-
dle income persons. 137 Also, in Lackawanna the city's action prevented
a private developer from building, whereas in Lindsay the city initiated
the housing project, was responsible for financing it, and made the ulti-
131 See generally U.L.I. RESEARCH REPORT 23, supra note 117.
132 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
133 Such defenses are common among government-defendants in public housing cases.
See, e.g., Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973); Crow v. Brown, 322 F. Supp.
382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), af'd per curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
134 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 et seq. (1968).
135 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
136 Id. at 1071. A finding similar to Lindsay was made in Acevedo v. Nassau County,
500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974). In this class action by low income blacks and Puerto
Ricans, the county's abandonment of a planned low income housing project did not con-
stitute racially-discriminatory treatment. Contra, Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
131 507 F.2d at 1069.
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mate decision not to proceed. 38  Likewise it was shown in Lackawanna
that the action of the city was prompted by improper racial considera-
tions and that the city had a history of discrimination in its land-use
planning. 3 9 These facts were conspicuously absent in Lindsay.
In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority140 local governmental of-
ficials were shown to have selected sites for lower income housing in
areas that were either all white or all black, resulting in racially segre-
gated communities. The Seventh Circuit ordered the housing authority
to construct new integrated public housing units on sites scattered
throughout Chicago in accordance with a strict ratio and timetable.
141
The holding in Gautreaux that deliberate racial segregation in public
housing was a violation of the fourteenth amendment is not particularly
startling. In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education142 it
was clearly established that governmentally enforced or sanctioned seg-
regation is an unconstitutional infringement of equal protection. This
principle has been uniformly applied to governmental programs of pub-
lic housing since Brown by every court in which such cases have been
brought. 143 What is significant in the above land-use cases is that courts
will often look beyond seemingly neutral governmental conduct for a dis-
criminatory pattern or effect. 1
44
ii. Zoning to Keep Multifamily or
Low Cost Housing Out of the Community
The allegation that the city of Eastlake was engaged in exclusionary
zoning by employing a zoning referendum to prevent Forest City Enter-
prises from building multifamily housing is not a unique development in
zoning litigation. Various zoning devices, including referenda, have
been subject to recent allegations of exclusionary zoning when such de-
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1070.
140 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974).
141 Contra, Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, P-H EQUAL OP. IN HOUSING 13,736
(6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1975). But see Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arling-
ton Hts., 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975). See also Otero v.
New York City Housing Auth., 354 F. Supp. 941 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Banks v. Perk, 341 F.
Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973);
Blackshear Residents Org. v. Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
142 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
143 U.L.I. RESEARCH REPORT 23, supra note 117, at 29. See, e.g., Heyward v. Public
Housing Admin., 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956); Detroit Housing Comm. v. Lewis, 226
F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955).
144 In United Farm Workers v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974), the
court found a racially-discriminatory effect resulting from the refusal of the city to ex-
tend city-owned sewer and water systems to planned public housing sites for migrant
workers located in an unincorported tract adjacent to Delray Beach. The city had no
initial obligation at law to extend such services outside its borders, but was shown to
have previously done so for white applicants. Thus the city was essentially estopped
from refusing like treatment to all applicants. Accord, Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Hts., 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
560 (1975). But see Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN
HOUSING, 13,736 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1975).
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vices work to preclude the construction of multifamily or low cost hous-
ing, since lower income housing usually is built in multifamily form.1 45
In Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston,4 6 the district court,
though ultimately ruling on a procedural issue, 47 stated that a city is not
required to rezone when the subject property cannot carry a higher usage
density, but "it cannot use arbitrary land use criteria and refuse to re-
zone for black projects where under the same circumstances it would
have granted a variance to an all-white project."1 4  The case arose out
of the refusal of the Evanston city council to rezone a nine acre parcel
from a maximum density of 157 units to a higher density designation which
would have permitted the construction of a 360 unit public housing de-
velopment. Significantly, the court pointed out in Evanston that "proof
of purpose and effect may establish racial discrimination despite the
seeming neutrality of the statute or ordinance."' 49
In two important recent cases, the outright prohibition of multifamily
housing was found to have a discriminatory effect. In United States v.
City of Black Jack'50 it was held that such an enactment by city coun-
cil, excluding a planned housing facility, had a racially discriminatory ef-
fect which could be justified only upon a showing of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. The city's interest in road and traffic control, pre-
vention of devaluation of adjacent single-family homes, and prevention
of school overcrowding was not a compelling interest when there was no
factual basis for the assertion that any such interest was furthered by
the ordinance.'5
In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel 52
the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously invalidated an ordinance
permitting only single-family detached dwellings. The court found that
the township's zoning provisions were so restrictive in their minimum
lot area, lot frontage, and building size requirements that multifamily
housing was precluded, and therefore the township's zoning was contrary
to the general welfare and beyond the scope of the zoning power. 53
145 For a discussion of the exclusionary zoning cases involving referendums see text ac-
companying notes 178-209 infra.
146 335 F. Supp. 396.(N.D. 11. 1971).
147 A claim for relief alleging exclusionary zoning practices could properly be sustained
under the fourteenth amendment as well as the United States Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1968).
'4 335 F. Supp. at 404. Contra, Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, P-H EQUAL OPP.
IN HousING 13,736 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1975).
149 355 F. Supp. at 403.
150 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
151 For background on the Black lack case see Pratter, Dispersed Subsidized Housing and
Suburbia: Confrontation in Black Jack, in AMEICAN SOCIErY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS,
1971 LAND-USE CONTROLS ANNUAL 147. It is interesting to note that Black lack is one
of the "planned communitites" which have been totally developed in the past decade
from the ground up. Compare the situation of Columbia, Maryland, another such com-
munity, in Commorrow, It Pays to Stay When Blacks Move In, MONEY, Nov., 1973, at 65.
152 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). Accord, Berenson v. Town of New Castle, P-H
EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING 15,049 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1975).
153 The Mt. Laurel court carefully confined its decision to state constitutional require-
ments. By so doing it may have precluded review by the Supreme Court. See D.
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Perhaps of greater significance than the Mt. Laurel holding with re-
gard to the multifamily housing issue was the court's wide-ranging con-
clusions on the larger questions of the right of developing municipalities
(like Eastlake) to limit kinds of housing. Central to these conclusions
was a determination whether such municipalities are under any obliga-
tion to make available a variety and choice of living accommodations.
The language of Justice Frederick Hall for the court in Mt. Laurel pro-
vides a succinct answer:
We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land use
regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an ap-
propriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically, pre-
sumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of
people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and
in its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at
least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present
and prospective regional need therefor. These obligations must
be met unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy
burden of demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dictate
that it should not be required so to do.15 1
At least one court has thus recognized that developing municipalities
have an affirmative duty to plan and provide, by their land-use regula-
tions and with the regional needs in view, for housing that meets the re-
quirements and resources of all persons who may desire to live within
their boundaries. 155
Mt. Laurel apparently also strikes down such allegedly exclusionary
multifamily zoning devices as restrictions on the maximum number of
bedrooms where multifamily housing is allowed, 5 the imposition of a
percentage ratio whereby multifamily units may not exceed single-family
CURME, FEDERAL CoURS 184-212 (2d ed. 1975); H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysTEM 470-526 (2d ed. 1973).
154 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25 (footnote omitted). For a forceful counterargument
to the advisability of a regional approach to zoning see Burchell, Listokin & James,
Exclusionary Zoning: Pitfalls of the Regional Remedy, 7 URBAN LAwYER 262 (1975).
The authors of that article conclude that a regional approach would tend to reinforce
existing exclusionary zoning practices and would also work to cut down the supply of
housing for those of modest income.
155 The Mt. Laurel court summarized its position as follows:
As a developing municipality, Mount Laurel must, by its land use regulations,
make realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice
of housing for all categories of people who may desire to live there, of course
including those of low and moderate income. It must permit multi-family hous-
ing, without bedroom or similar restrictions, as well as small dwellings on very
small lots, low cost housing of other types and, in general, high density zoning,
without artificial and unjustifiable minimum requirements as to lot size, build-
ing size and the like, to meet the full panoply of these needs. Certainly when
a municipality zones for industry and commerce for local tax benefit purposes,
it without question must zone to permit adequate housing within the means of
the employees involved in such uses.
67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32.
156 Such restrictions typically take the form of absolute proscriptions against units with
more than two bedrooms or percentage ratios limiting the units in a multifamily de-
velopment to one or two bedrooms. U.L.I. RESEARCH REPORT 23 supra note 117, at 39.
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residences within a community, 5 7 and perhaps the prohibition of mobile
homes.15 8  The mix of housing types mandated by Mt. Laurel would
also presumably invalidate the practice of excessive zoning for industrial
and commercial uses which could thereby preclude the availability of
sites for multifamily, low income housing. 59 It is clear in Mt. Laurel
that the municipality must zone to permit adequate housing for the work-
ers involved in such uses, enabling them to reside in the community in
which they work and contribute payroll taxes.
80
iii. Other Exclusionary Zoning Devices
Of primary concern are the exclusionary zoning issues just discussed
and those cases involving referenda yet to be discussed since such issues
are most applicable to the Eastlake fact situation. Other zoning prac-
tices alleged to be exclusionary warrant some discussion, however, since
most litigation involving these devices has been directed at developing
"bedroom communities" similar in suburban styling to the city of East-
lake.
aa. Exclusive Zoning
The basic feature common to most "exclusive" land-use devices is
that they ensure, in varying degrees, that those who move into the com-
munity can well afford it. In other words, such zoning imposes legal
requirements that necessarily add to housing costs, and thus has the ef-
fect of limiting or altogether excluding housing for lower income persons.
One prevalent device is large lot zoning whereby only the well-to-do
can afford such sizeable parcels. In National Land & Investment Co.
v. Kohn, 8' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a zoning ordi-
nance prescribing a four acre minimum residential lot size. To that
court, such a zoning scheme was outwardly exclusionary, and therefore
an unreasonable and unlawful use of zoning power. Shortly thereafter,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also invalidated two and three acre
minimum lot size requirements in In re Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders,
Inc., 16 2 utilizing a similar rationale. In Ybarra v. City of Town of Los
157 Id.
l See 67 N.J. at 202, 336 A.2d at 740 (1975) (Pashman, J., concurring). Although not
multifamily housing per se, mobile homes are usually of the low cost variety and situ-
ated on lots of high usage density. See e.g., Green v. Township of Lima, 40 Mich. App.
655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972); Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192
N.W.2d 322 (1971).
159 See 67 N.J. at 202, 336 A.2d at 740 (1975) (Pashman, J., concurring).
160 See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645, 1663-
64 (1971), for the proposition that exclusionary zoning may restrict social mobility by
limiting opportunities for employment. Support for such proposition is found in the
contention that the trend of industrial migration from city to suburb combined with the
lack of adequate low cost housing in the suburbs has caused many blue-collar workers
to be confronted with a choice between incurring the expense of commuting to work or
doing without work. The end result, according to the commentator, is a heightening
of the unemployment problem in urban areas which may become permanent.
161 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
161 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). See also Schere v. Township of Freehold, 119
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Altos Hills,16 3 however, a one acre minimum lot size requirement was
upheld as rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in pre-
serving the town's rural environment.
Other "expense-oriented" zoning includes regulations that add to the
cost of multifamily housing by requiring such items as underground
electrical lines, air-conditioning, tennis courts, and swimming pools, 164
regulations that add to the cost of a single family housing by establishing
minimum interior floor size requirements' 16 5 or minimum frontage re-
quirements, 166 and regulations requiring improvements to dwellings that
are excessively costly and practically unnecessary, forming a maintenance
burden that only the wealthy can bear.1 67 This last exclusionary device is,
of course, to be distinguished from local zoning measures concerning
necessary housing upkeep reasonably related to the public health, safety,
and welfare.
bb. "Status Quo" Zoning
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas168 a local zoning provision limit-
ing occupancy of one family dwellings to "traditional" families, or to
groups of not more than two unrelated persons was attacked as an in-
fringement of the rights to travel and privacy. The Supreme Court in
upholding the ordinance failed to find any fundamental right involved,
and applied the minimum scrutiny equal protection test to the ordinance,
that is, whether the law was "reasonable, not arbitrary" and bore "a
rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective."'6 9  The Court
found Belle Terre's ordinance valid under such test, reaffirming the tra-
ditional Euclid-based justifications for zoning promoted by the ordi-
nance, such as family values and protection of the environment. 76
In a sense, one has trouble fitting Belle Terre into the typical exclu-
sionary zoning mold. The aggrieved parties under the town ordinance
were not minority group members, but a homeowning couple and their
six college student lessees who were ordered by Belle Terre to remedy
the ordinance violation. Also, the use of the word "family" seems not of
itself exclusionary, unless perhaps, it can be shown that minorities and
the poor form "voluntary" families of more than two unrelated persons
N.J. Super. 433, 292 A.2d 35 (1972) (40,000 sq. ft. minimum lot size requirement inval-
idated).
163 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
164 U.L.I. RESEARCH REPORT 23, supra note 117, at 39. See e.g., Molino v. Borough of
Glassboro, 116 N.J. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971).
165 BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 117, at 11.
166 U.L.I. RESEARCH REPORT 23, supra note 117, at 39. See also, Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
167 BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 117, at 11-12.
1 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Accord, Town of Durham v. White Enterprises, Inc., P-H EQUAL
OPP. IN HOUSING 15,050 (N. H. Jan. 12, 1976).
169 416 U.S. at 8, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See also 23 CLEVE. ST.
L. REV. 354 (1974).
170 416 U.S. at 9.
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more frequently than other groups and consequently such ordinance is
discriminatory in effect.' 7 1
Zoning to exclude "traditional" families is arguably irrelevant to the
public health, safety, and welfare since it only serves to impose social
preferences and cannot be sustained merely on such basis. 7 2  Further,
maintaining the "status quo" with a "traditional family" standard ensures
that persons of lower income will not join together to pool resources
enabling themselves to purchase and live in an expensive one family
dwelling.
Another prevalent "status quo" zoning method alleged to be exclu-
sionary is restrictions upon the residential use of land over time - time
controls. In Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo 73 this de-
vice was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals as founded upon a
rational basis. The town comprehensive zoning ordinance was designed
to pace town development and withhold building permits for up to eigh-
teen years until schools, sewers, and other town services could be es-
tablished in accordance with its growth. The Ramapo court found such
phased growth reasonable since the existing physical and financial re-
sources of the community were inadequate to furnish the essential gov-
ernmental services and facilities necessitated by a substantial increase
in population.
Critics of Ramapo contend that "time controls" are actually "status
quo" exclusionary land devices masquerading as measures to preserve
the environment and like considerations . 7  Furthermore, "staged
growth" of a community through "time controls" and other "status quo"
land use devices is an arguable restriction on the right to travel, 75 and
seems inapposite to the regional fair share doctrine of housing "mixes"
promoted by decisions like Mt. Laurel.'7 6
It is worthy to note that the record in Ramapo was absent any racial
or economic discriminatory pattern or effect. Further, the town's ordi-
171 See 23 CLEVE. ST. L. REV., 354, 359 (1974). See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,
145 (1971) (Marshall, j., dissenting); Village of Belie Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 12
(1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172 Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 816 (1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
See Note, Excluding the Commune from Suburbia: The Use of Zoning for Social Con-
trol, 23 HASTINGS L. J. 1459 (1972).
173 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972).
174 See e.g., Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the
Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 234 (1073).
171 Construction Industry Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Calif. 1974),
rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1976). See also Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir.
1974); Brief for Lawyers for Housing as Amicus Curiae at 11-20, Forest City Enter-
prises v. Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
17 The Mt. Laurel court, in disucussing Ramapo, merely stated that such a plan would not
be utilized as a tool to exclude all development and must include low income housing,
which is precisely what the Ramapo Court set forth. Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 188 n.20, 336 A.2d 713, 732 n.20
(1975); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 285 N.E.2d
291, 302, 334 N.Y.S. 138, 152 (1972). See also Berenson v. Town of New Castle,
P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HousiNG 15,049 (N.Y. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 1975).
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nance served to pace development of the urban sprawl reaching out
from New York City, not to preclude any particular type of housing.
The ordinance was not mere verbiage, as the town had committed itself
to planned growth through a capital budget plan. The glare of neon
lights up and down suburban main streets, and backed-up sewers in
"dream" split-levels lead one to believe that the Ramapo plan was not
exclusionary zoning, but perhaps common sense.
177
2. Is There Exclusionary Zoning in Eastlake?
a. Motivational Analysis of Zoning Referendums
Justice Stem, in the Eastlake concurrence, leveled a serious charge
at municipalities which have zoning referenda in their charters:
Zoning provisions such as that in Eastlake's charter have a single
motive, and that is to exclude, to build walls against the ills,
poverty, racial strife, and the people themselves, of our urban
areas.
178
The view of the concurrence that the city of Eastlake's referendum was
founded upon discriminatory motives amounts to an allegation of bad
faith against local governments and their citizens. 179  Ascribing uncon-
stitutional motivations to a law, however, particularly one involving
referendum voting,18 0 makes an inordinate amount of judicial guess-
177 The rationale for such belief was cogently expressed by one individual as follows:
Why should any thinking and intelligent person welcome increased tax burdens
upon himself and a reduction in the worth of his home? This is what he has
sweated and toiled against: substandard zoning, low income housing, and
other governmental subsidy programs that take bread from his pocket. This
is not racism or moral irresponsibility, this is common sense upon his part.
Most of the affluent suburbs that I know are having difficulty in keeping their
heads above the water of financial difficulty. Won't these and other gentlemen
understand that our views are not racist or moral irresponsibility, but only our
American heritage of striving to keep a decent, respectable way of life?
Letter to the Editor, Racism in Mahwah is Denied, Bergen (New Jersey) Record, Mar. 2,
1971, quoted in Burchell, Listokin & James, Exclusionary Zoning: Pitfalls of the Re-
gional Remedy, 7 URBAN LAWYER 262, 263-64 (1975).
17' 41 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 324 N.E.2d at 749 (emphasis added).
179 Allegations that local governmental land-use decisions are racially or otherwise uncon-
stitutionally motivated entail numerous problems. Perhaps the most serious problem is
that of proof since direct evidence of discriminatory motivations is rare. Rather, infer-
ences must be drawn from all the circumstances of a particular decision. The conclusion
that some unconstitutional motivation prompted the land-use decision of necessity in-
volves a leap of faith by the court. Sager, Troubled Waters: Litigation in the Federal
Courts Against Exclusionary Land Use Restraints, in National Committee Against Dis-
crimination in Housing, Exclusionary Land Use Litigation Policy and Strategy for the
Future 20, 21-22 (1974).
"0 It is important to note that exclusionary zoning controversies involving initiatives and
referenda have generally been regarded as distinct from other exclusionary zoning
cases. The element of voting rights in the former distinguishes them from the latter.
Such distinction was recognized in Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F.
Supp. 396 (N.D. I11. 1971), an exclusionary zoning case which did not involve referen-
da. The court stated that the presence of voting rights in referendum cases adds a
constitutional dimension not found in pure zoning cases resulting in a greater willing-
ness on the part of the courts to uphold a referendum rather than interfere with the fun-
damental right to vote. Id. at 403.
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work necessary. 18' And the practical uselessness of judicial scrutiny of
such motivations underlying initiatives and referenda was cogently
pointed out by the Sixth Circuit in Raniel v. City of Lansing,'82 in its re-
jection of the district court's examination of motives underlying a zoning
referendum:
In holding that the referendum was motivated by racial factors,
the District Court necessarily had to reach the conclusion by
searching the minds of 15% of the electorate who signed the
referendum petition, and the remaining 85% who were enjoined
from voting, none of whom were called as witnesses to testify
in the case .... 13
The Supreme Court has also considered possible unconstitutional
motives underlying state action. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot 1 4 the Court
invalidated the Alabama legislature's redrawing the boundary lines of
the city of Tuskegee, changing its shape from a square to an "uncouth
twenty-eight sided figure." This legislative act effectively gerryman-
dered all but a handful of black voters out of the city limits. There is
little doubt that such blatant action by the legislature was racially dis-
criminatory in nature. As Justice Frankfurter stated for the Court in
Gomillion, "[a]cts generally lawful [redistricting] may become unlawful
when done to accomplish an unlawful end."'18 5
Such language implied that the Supreme Court would examine under-
lying motivations if the opportunity were presented. Thus, Gomillion was
at first interpreted to apply to legislative intent and motivation in four
subsequent Supreme Court decisions involving the constitutionality of
Sunday closing laws,'8 6 and in the landmark decision prohibiting manda-
tory prayer in public school classrooms, Abington School District v.
Schempp. 8 7 In United States v. O'Brien,"' however, the Court explained
that Gomillion was a greatly misunderstood case, standing for the propo-
sition that "the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it un-
constitutional," and not for the premise that legislative motive is an ap-
propriate basis for rendering it so. 189
181 See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
182 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970).
183 Id. at 323.
184 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
15 Id. at 347, quoting United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 357 (1912).
's McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mar-
ket, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
187 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The court observed that "to withstand the strictures of the Es-
tablishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. at 222.
188 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
189 Id. at 384. As the Court explicitly set forth in O'Brien, quoting McCray v. United
States, 196 U.S. 27, 56 (1904):
The decisions of this Court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the
assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the
[Vol. 24:635
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss4/4
EASTLAKE
One writer has suggested that the motivational analyses of state action
by the Supreme Court are nothing but a confusing morass.19 It is ap-
parent, however, that the Supreme Court put to rest the question of whether
or not to weigh legislative and voter motivations underlying mandatory
land-use referenda by not doing so in James v. Valtierra.'9' In other
words, the question of motivation for such a referendum is not appropriate
for judicial inquiry:
If the voters' purpose is to be found here, then, it would seem to
require far more than a simple application of objective standards.
If the true motive is to be ascertained not through speculation but
through a probing of the private attitudes of the voters, the inquiry
would entail an intolerable invasion of the privacy that must pro-
tect an exercise of the franchise.19 2
b. "Effect" Analysis of Zoning Referenda
The unconstitutional effects of a law enacted through the initiative and
referendum process are often readily observable and thus open for exacting
inquiry, unlike the abstract and indefinite myriad of personal motivations
underlying the law's passage, which are practically impossible to ascer-
tain. 93  As seen earlier, racially-discriminatory effects of specific state
action can be readily detected. Therefore, unconstitutional effects of a
law enacted by referendum may be scrutinized by a court, 94 on a case by
case basis. 95
assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be ex-
erted.
Id. at 383.
190 If only logical tidiness hung in the balance, bemusement might be a satisfactory
response to all this. But the rights of individuals are at stake. The Court should
stop pretending it does not remember opinions on which the ink is barely dry
and try to formulate principles for deciding on what occasions and in what ways
the motivation of legislators or other government officials is relevant to constitu-
tional issues.
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1211-12 (1970).
191 402 U.S. 137 (1971). In upholding the California constitutional provision mandating
referendum approval of any low rent housing project, the Court found that the record
would not justify a claim that the law, neutral on its face, was actually directed at a ra-
cial minority. To lend support to its finding the court cited Gomillion.
192 Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Orgs. v. Union City, 441 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir.
1970); accord, Spaulding v. Blair, 403 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1968).
193 As set forth in Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Hts., 517 F.2d
409, 413 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975):
[r]egardless of the Village [Zoning] Board's motivation, if . . .alleged dis-
criminatory effect exists, the decision [of the zoning board in refusing to rezone
property for low income housing] violates the Equal Protection Clause unless
the Village can justify it by showing a compelling interest.
Contra, Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HoUSINC 13,736
(6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1975), where a "rational basis" test was employed in a fact situation
similar to the Arlington Heights case.
's" Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Orgs. v. Union City, 421 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir.
1970).
'9 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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Thus, in Reitman v. Mulkey' 96 and Hunter v. Erickson,197 the effects
of housing laws passed by the electorate pursuant to referenda were
found by the Supreme Court to be racially discriminatory. Both in Reit-
man and Hunter, those affected by the referendum provisions were all or
almost all members of a racial minority, and the discriminatory harm was
clearly demonstrated. In Hunter, an Akron, Ohio city charter provision
required that any fair housing ordinance be submitted to a vote of the
electorate before it became effective. This was seen by the Court to con-
tain "an explicitly racial classification treating racial housing matters
differently from other racial and housing matters."'' 9  The discriminatory
effect found in Reitman stemmed from a provision in the California State
constitution which prevented the state from prohibiting private racial
discrimination in housing by forbidding the state to deny or abridge the
right of any person to decline to sell, lease, or rent real property to those
persons the property owner chose in his absolute discretion. 9
In the Eastlake concurrence, Justice Stern argued that a racially and
economically discriminatory effect was readily discernible in the action of
the city of Eastlake and many neighboring communities:
In the suburbs surrounding the city of Cleveland, the requirement
of mandatory referendums for approval of zoning changes has
been adopted by over a dozen communities; some of these com-
munities have provisions which specifically apply to any zoning
change to permit multi-family or low-income housing. The in-
evitable effect of such provisions is to perpetuate the de facto
divisions in our society between black and white, rich and poor.2"'
The facts in Eastlake, however, actually take on more the appearance
of the "traditional" zoning case of a developer challenging restrictions
which prevent him from more profitably using his land, rather than the
"typical" exclusionary zoning action brought by aggrieved minority group
members zoned out of a community. 21 The Eastlake charter provision
has no explicit racial effect. Eastlake's mandatory zoning referendum
affects all zoning law changes made by the city council upon any type of
land use - not merely those pertaining to housing or a particular type of
housing.202  Also, no direct parties in Eastlake were "excluded" minority
196 Id.
197 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
198 Id. at 389.
1 387 U.S. 371 n.2.
200 41 Ohio St. 2d at 200-01, 324 N.E.2d at 749.
The communities surrounding Cleveland which have enacted mandatory zoning ref-
erenda total nineteen: Bay Village, Broadview Heights, Eastlake, Euclid, Garfield
Heights, Highland Heights, Independence, Kirtland, Mayfield Village, Middleburg
Heights, Moreland Hills, North Ridgeville, Parma, Pepper Pike, Seven Hills, Strongs-
ville, Westlake, Willoughby Hills, Willowick. It should be noted that most of the above
provisions were enacted subsequent to the Supreme Court decision in James v. Val-
tierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), which upheld a mandatory referendum provision in the
California constitution relative to low income housing projects.
201 See notes 119-23, supra, and accompanying text.
101 As pointed out by the Supreme Court in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 14041:
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group members; 03 and no blatant discriminatory purpose is evident.
Likewise, Forest City Enterprises alleged no economic or racial discrimina-
tion and any effect the charter referendum has had upon it is reflected
solely in the company's financial position.0 4
As indicated above, many suburbs which surround Cleveland utilize
mandatory land-use referenda.0 5 Furthermore, most of these com-
munities in Cuyahoga County, Lake County, and Summit County, Ohio
contain virtually no low income or minority residents.0 6 As set forth in
the brief for Lawyers for Housing as amicus curiae:
Cuyahoga County is a racially segregated county. The popula-
tion of Cuyahoga County in 1970 was 1,721,300; 328,419 (19.1%)
of whom were Negro. 87% of these 328,419 Negroes reside in
Cleveland. Of the 40,578 who reside outside of Cleveland but
within Cuyahoga County, 80% live in three eastern suburbs ....
[Alt present, Cuyahoga County has the racial shape of a donut,
with the Negroes in the hole and with mostly whites occupying
the ring.20
The city of Eastlake is in Lake County, Ohio, but near the eastern
fringes of Cuyahoga County. The position of Justice Stern and the argu-
ments of amicus curiae suggest that referendum zoning is being employed
effectively by Cleveland-area suburbs to bar access to low income and
minority group members. Certainly, the demographic statistics set forth
above are strong evidence that something is keeping many Cleveland-
area suburbs segregated. There is, however, no clear evidence in amicus
curiae's brief, Justice Stem's analysis, or any other known source that
referendum zoning in particular is or has excluded blacks and the poor
from Eastlake, Ohio, or any other community.
Racial disparity alone does not amount to racial discrimination. 2°
The Court [in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)] held that the amend-
ment [to the Akron, Ohio city charter, requiring submission of all fair housing
ordinances to a popular vote] created a classification based upon race because
it required that laws dealing with racial housing matters could take effect only
if they survived a mandatory referendum while other housing ordinances took
effect without any special election.
203 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), for exclusionary zoning standing require-
ments. See also note 121 supra.
204 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), and note 121 supra, for the distinction be-
tween racial and economic effects in exclusionary housing matters, and criteria for
standing to sue upon the basis of the unconstitutionality of racial or economic exclu-
sion from a community.
205 41 Ohio St. 2d at 200-01, 324 N.E.2d at 749. See note 200 supra.
206 See Brief for Lawyers for Housing as Amicus Curiae at 1-7 Forest City Enterprises,
Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St.2d 187, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
207 Id. at 9-10, quoting Mahaley v. Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp.
1257, 1259 (N.D. Ohio 1973). The three eastern suburbs where a substantial number
of the blacks living outside Cleveland reside are East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights,
and Shaker Heights, none of which have provisions for mandatory zoning referenda.
One suburb, however, which has a charter referendum provision, Garfield Heights, has a
substantial black population.
208 Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Hts., 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.
1975). See also Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HoUSING
13,736 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1975).
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A clear-cut pattern of specific, direct, discriminatory zoning action must
exist before the serious charge of exclusionary zoning is to be accorded
weight for equal protection purposes.20 9  From the record of Eastlake no
such action is evident. It is not contended that Justice Stern and the other
concurring Justices are wrong in alleging that exclusionary zoning is un-
constitutionally promulgated by some local governmental entities through
land-use control methods. The exclusionary zoning cases discussed earlier
are testament to such a possibility. It appears, however, that such allega-
tions are unconvincingly applied to the city of Eastlake's charter referen-
dum, and other local governmental provisions that neutrally provide for
mandatory referenda upon all zoning law changes.
IV. THE EASTLAKE DiSSENT
The concise dissent of Justice Corrigan2t 0 served three functions. The
first was his allusion to the applicability of Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago,211 as opposed to Eubank v. City of Richmond,2 1 2 or Washington
ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,21 3 upon the issue in Eastlake
involving the reasonableness of controlling the rezoning of Forest City
Enterprises' eight acre parcel through the consent of the neighboring
community in a referendum election.2
14
As previously discussed, the situation in Eastlake is more akin to Cusack
than either Eubank or Roberge. That is, the Eastlake referendum con-
cerned the removal of existing zoning restrictions rather than their im-
position. 21 5 This distinction was summarized by the dissent:
While the Cusack decision has been criticized . . . , it has been
generally followed. And, even though it is impossible to lay down
a hard-and-fast rule, we conclude that if an ordinance permits a
certain percentage of the property owners to impose or create a
restriction upon their neighbors' property by the devise [sic] of
consent provisions, such limitation constitutes an invalid delega-
tion of legislative power, but if the consent provision merely
waives or modifies a lawful and reasonable legislative restriction
or prohibition, it is within constitutional limitations. 1 6
255 See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of
Toledo, P-H EQUAL OPP. IN HOUSING 13,736 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1975); Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Hts., 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974); Citizens Comm. for Fara-
day Woods v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974); United Farmworkers v. City of
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston,
335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna,
318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
210 41 Ohio St. 2d at 202-07, 324 N.E.2d at 749-53. Justice Celebrezze joined in the
dissent.
211 424 U.S. 526 (1912).
212 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
213 226 U.S. 116 (1912).
214 41 Ohio St. 2d at 202-04, 324 N.E.2d at 749-51. See text accompanying notes 40-59
supra, for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
215 Id.
216 41 Ohio St. 2d at 203, 324 N.E.2d at 750-51, quoting Valkanet v. City of Chicago, 31
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Justice Corrigan's second point was the great weight accorded the
long tradition of statutory referendum in Ohio. 217 This reliance was well
taken, if for only the fact that the Supreme Court used similar reasoning
in James v. Valtierra.218 As Justice Corrigan noted, other Ohio municipal
referenda with provisions similar to Eastlake's were upheld in the recent
Ohio Supreme Court decisions of Cook-Johnson Realty Co. v. Bertolini, 19
and State ex rel. Bramblette v. Yordy.2 2
0
In Cook-Johnson, a township permissive referendum upon a zoning
question called by initiative petition pursuant to section 519.12 of the
Ohio Revised Code was deemed fully constitutional. Upheld in Bram-
blette was a municipal charter provision excluding referenda upon local
revenue raising ordinances, although such referenda were mandatory
under state statute. As pointed out by Justice Corrigan, the adoption of
a charter frees a municipality from many state code procedures, and such
municipal corporation may be more or less restrictive as to the use of
referenda. 22 1 Thus he concluded that the referendum provisions of the
Eastlake city charter were not invalid under such provisions of the Ohio
constitution. 222
Justice Corrigan's third argument was that the citizens of a commu-
nity have a legitimate interest in a zoning change.2 2 3  The majority
opinion used consent requirements as a basis for striking down the East-
lake referendum; 2 4 the concurrence viewed Eastlake as primarily an
exclusionary zoning case.225 The dissent, however, distinguished both
in favor of the overwhelming concern of electoral decisionmaking, 26
finding the Eastlake referendum not violative of due process. 27
Justice Corrigan based his due process conclusions upon a case similar
to Eastlake - Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organizations
(SASSO) v. Union City.228  In SASSO the city council rezoned a par-
ticular tract of land to allow multifamily residential use.229 The ordi-
nance, however, was repealed by a voter referendum held via initiative
Il]. App. 2d 268, 272, 148 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1958). Accord, State ex rel. Standard Oil v.
Combs, 129 Ohio St. 251, 194 N.E. 875 (1935), cited in 41 Ohio St. 2d at 203, 324
N.E.2d at 751.
217 41 Ohio St. 2d at 206-07, 324 N.E.2d at 752-53. See the detailed discussion of such
tradition in the text accompanying notes 72-91 supra.
215 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
219 15 Ohio St. 2d 195, 239 N.E.2d 80 (1968), cited in 41 Ohio St. 2d at 206, 324 N.E.2d
at 752. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
22o 24 Ohio St. 2d 147, 265 N.E.2d 272 (1970), cited in 41 Ohio St. 2d at 207, 324 N.E.2d
at 752. See note 88 supra.
221 Id.
222 41 Ohio St. 2d at 207, 324 N.E.2d at 752. The Ohio constitutional provision referred
to is art. II, § if, which is set forth in note 5 supra.
223 41 Ohio St. 2d at 204-05, 324 N.E.2d at 751-52, quoting Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Orgs. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
224 See text accompanying notes 40-59 supra.
221 See text accompanying notes 178-209 supra.
226 41 Ohio St. 2d at 204, 324 N.E.2d at 751-52.
227 Id. at 206, 324 N.E.2d at 752.
228 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
229 Id. at 292.
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petition under California law.230 The Southern Alameda Spanish Speak-
ing Organization, which had an option to purchase the particular tract
for low rent housing, brought suit, alleging the referendum to be violative
of their rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment.2 31
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a preliminary
injunction and the convening of a three-judge court, having found that
neither the zoning process nor the effect upon the organization was a
denial of due process.232 By relying on SASSO, Justice Corrigan force-
fully rebutted the approaches of his colleagues in the Eastlake majority
and concurring opinions. SASSO also seems consistent with Supreme
Court decisions suggesting that the right to vote is the essence of de-
mocracy since it is preservative of all other rights.
233
V. CONCLUSION
The Eastlake majority interpreted mandatory zoning referenda as
granting a city council the power to rezone and the people the power to
invalidate council's zoning law change. The Ohio Supreme Court found
this two-step process to be arbitrary, capricious, and therefore unconsti-
tutional. This finding, however, does not totally eliminate a charter zon-
ing referendum provision. The lesson of Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of
Chicago23 4 is that a zoning provision which entirely prohibits a particular
use, but allows for removal of that prohibition, is not unconstitutional.
This is a rather thin line for future charter writers to walk, but it never-
theless exists.
Consistent with this "Cusack line" is a zoning provision which pro-
motes present zoning stability and allows for rezoning by referendum.
Above all, the provision must make it absolutely clear that any action by
city council to amend the zoning code and to approve rezoning is only
preliminary to the final approval by the people in a referendum election.
In other words, any future referendum provision in an Ohio municipal
charter will have to describe the complete zoning amendment process as
one large "consent requirement" - a one-step process.
Although exclusionary zoning does not appear to exist in Eastlake,
21 Id. The initiative provision was CAL. ELECION COnE § 4052 (West 1975) which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
If the legislative body does not entirely repeal the ordinance against which the
petition is filed, the legislative body shall submit the ordinance to the voters,
either at a regular municipal election . . .or at a special election . ... The
ordinance shall not become effective until a majority of the voters voting on the
ordinance vote in favor of it. If the legislative body repeals the ordinance or
submits the ordinance to the voters and a majority of the voters voting on the
ordinance do not vote in favor of it, the ordinance shall not again be enacted by
the legislative body for a period of one year after the date of its repeal by the
legislative body or disapproval by the voters.
231 424 F.2d at 292.
232 Id. at 294.
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965). Accord, Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), and cases cited therein.
-4 242 U.S. 526 (1971).
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this land-use practice can develop through the implementation of manda-
tory zoning referenda. As discussed previously, a discriminatory effect
which is violative of equal protection may result from a prior pattern of
discrimination through the imposition of land-use controls that only af-
fect racial minorities or the poor. Thus the use of mandatory zoning
referenda must be closely monitored.
The apparent impracticalities of mandatory referendum zoning must
not be overlooked. A general election upon every community zoning
change seems unwieldy at best. Moreover, a persuasive argument may
be made that the larger the community becomes, the less valid is the
interest of a voter on the east side of a metropolis in a zoning change on
the west side. In terms of Euclid, such zoning may bear little rational
relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare, and may be outwardly
unreasonable. If Eastlake rested upon such basis, it would be a more
palatable decision and more constitutionally justifiable. Instead, the
Ohio Supreme Court chose to confront the right to referendum "head on."
In doing so, a dangerous precedent concerning democratic initiative and
referendum procedures, whether or not related to zoning, has been intro-
duced into Ohio law.
FRANK J. KUNDRAT, JR.
STEPHEN BOND
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